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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 880455-CA

CHANCE COLLAR, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LANE MURRAY, d.b.a. ROCKY
MOUNTAIN SALES and SAMUEL C.
THOMPSON,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SAMUEL C. THOMPSON
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of a summary judgment entered in what was
formerly the Seventh Judicial District Court of Uintah County,
State of Utah, and which is now designated as the Eighth Judicial
District Court of Uintah County, State of Utah.

The Utah Supreme

Court had original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (i) (1987) because the Court of Appeals does
not have original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3 (1987).

This Court currently has jurisdiction

pursuant to a transfer of this case by the Supreme Court of Utah
to this Court pursuant to the Supreme Court's authority to do so
under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) and Rule 4A of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's motion

for summary judgment based upon the doctrine of collateral
estoppel when a jury in a separate and distinct case found for an
unrelated plaintiff which had brought suit on a separate and
distinct transaction with the defendants?
2.

Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's motion

for summary judgment based on a jury verdict in a separate case
when the record in this case contains unresolved material issues
of fact?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Rule 56. Summary Judgment,

(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The
motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Procedural History

The plaintiff filed its original complaint seeking to
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recover the purchase price of certain drill collars it delivered
to defendant Lane Murray d.b.a. as Rocky Mountain Sales.

(R. 1)

(Drill collars are pieces of equipment used in drilling for oil.)
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint joining as a
defendant the appellant before this Court, Samuel Thompson.
21)

(R.

The plaintiff alleged that Samuel Thompson acted in concert

with the defendant Murray to commit fraud upon the plaintiff, and
therefore, plaintiff was entitled to rescind the transaction at
issue.

To support this contention, the plaintiff alleged as

follows:
1.

That Samuel Thompson gave representatives of the

plaintiff false credit information about Lane Murray which
induced the plaintiff to sell the drill collars to defendant
Murray.
2.

(R. 22)
That defendant Samuel Thompson took delivery of the

equipment from defendant Murray and thereafter hid the
equipment from the plaintiff and denied knowledge of its
whereabouts.

(R. 22)

In addition, plaintiff alleged that

defendant Samuel Thompson was attempting to alter or sell
the drill collars.
3.

(R. 22)

That defendant Samuel Thompson was not a bona fide

purchaser of the collars.

(R. 23)

The defendant Samuel Thompson denied plaintiff's allegations
and cross-claimed against defendant Lane Murray based upon the
fact that he purchased the drill collars from Mr. Murray in good
faith without the knowledge of plaintiff's claims and/or interest
3

therein and that he had fully paid for the collars,

(R. 47)

In

the cross-claim, defendant Samuel Thompson sought relief from
defendant Lane Murray should the Court find the plaintiff's
interest in the drill collars superior to his.

(R. 50)

On May 21, 1984, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the
amended complaint to include a cause of action based on the Utah
Fraudulent Conveyances Act and causes of action alleging
violation of state and federal Racketeer Influence and Corrupt
Organizations Acts.

(R. 98)

In addition, although there is no

motion to consolidate with a supporting memorandum in the record,
plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in support of a motion to
consolidate which indicates a request by the plaintiffs to
consolidate this case with another case pending in Uintah County
at that time, LOR, Inc. v. Lane Murray d.b.a. Rocky Mountain
Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, Civil No. 12386. (hereinafter LOR)
(R. 105)

The plaintiff sought to consolidate these two cases

because plaintiff claimed the questions of law and fact were
identical in each, (R. 106) and therefore, under Rule 42 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, consolidation would be judicially
and financially economical and efficient.

(R. 106-107)

The defendant Samuel Thompson requested the court dismiss
both the motion to amend the complaint (R. 119) and the motion to
consolidate.

(R. 113)

He argued that consolidation would be

improper because the cases involved two separate plaintiffs, two
independent transactions and factual scenarios, and two separate
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claims for relief.

(R. 123)

The defendant also sought to

dismiss plaintiff's motion to amend because there was no evidence
of a violation of state or federal racketeering laws and to allow
an amendment would substantially harm defendant and defendant's
business.

(R. 119)

On July 29, 1984, the Honorable Richard C. Davidson denied
both plaintiff's motion to consolidate the cases and the motion
to amend the complaint.

(R. 127)

Thereafter, on March 29, 1985, the plaintiff filed a motion
seeking summary judgment that defendant Samuel Thompson was not a
good-faith purchaser of the drill collars, that the plaintiff had
voidable title and was entitled to rescind the transaction with
Lane Murray and take possession of the collars.

(R. 146)

This

motion was based solely on the plaintiff's allegations that the
issues had already been litigated in the LOR case, and therefore,
pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, plaintiff Chance
Collar was entitled to judgment as a matter of lav;. (R. 149-153)
The defendant filed a memorandum in opposition stating that
summary judgment would be inappropriate due to the fact that the
LOR case involved separate parties, issues and facts and there
were questions of fact in the record which precluded summary
judgment. (R. 158-160)

To support this position, an affidavit

was filed by defendant Samuel Thompson that questioned the
validity of certain evidence produced and relied upon by the
plaintiff.

(R. 161-162)

In his affidavit, Samuel Thompson
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denied giving false credit information to any agent of the
plaintiff, and he also denied the validity of certain telephone
records that plaintiff had produced in discovery•

The plaintiff

sought to use these telephone records to support its allegations
that the defendant Samuel Thompson had talked to agents of the
plaintiff on certain days and gave those agents false credit
information on Lane Murray.

However, as outlined in Samuel

Thompson's affidavit, the calls at issue would have been
impossible because he had suffered a fire in his shop which had
destroyed phone service on the dates indicated in the phone
records.

(R. 161)

These telephone records at issue were not

part of the evidence or record in the LOR case, and therefore
their validity and credibility has never been addressed by a
finder of fact.
After a request by Clark Allred, attorney for the plaintiff,
for the court to rule on the motion for summary judgment, Judge
Davidson granted plaintiff's motion in a Minute Entry dated
September 9, 1985.

(R. 178)

Thereafter, on September 18, 1985, nine days after the
Minute Entry indicates judgment was granted, counsel for the
plaintiff submitted a memorandum of attached documents supporting
motion for summary judgment.

(R. 179)

Included in this packet

were certain documents from the LOR case including:
1.

The original complaint;

2.

A motion, stipulation and order to intervene as a

defendant filed by Samuel C. Thompson;
6

3.

Defendant Samuel Thompson's answer, counterclaim and

cross-claim;
4.

The plaintiff LOR'S answer to the counterclaim;

5.

A 2-page minute entry outlining the sequence of events

at the trial in the LOR case;
6.

The verdict form in the LOR case indicating that the

plaintiff LOR was entitled to the drill collars and that
defendant Samuel Thompson was not entitled to receive
damages therefrom;
7.

The order and judgment on the verdict; and

8.

Copies of the jury instructions Nos. 10 through 20A.

Thereafter, the court entered its written summary judgment
on or about October 1, 1985.

A copy of the judgment is included

in the addendum to this brief as Exhibit "A".

This summary

judgment included certain findings of fact:
1. The issues in the case of LOR, Inc.
vs. Murray et al related to the ownership of
certain drill collars. The issues were
whether Defendant, Thompson, had acquired
title to the drill collars as a good faith
purchaser or had acquired the drill collars
through fraud in concert with Defendant,
Murray.
2. The evidence presented in LOR, Inc.
vs. Murray showed a common scheme whereby
Defendants, Murray and Thompson, acquired
both the LOR Inc. and the Chance Collar
Company drill collars by fraud. Defendant,
Thompson's claim for payment for both sets of
drill collars was based on the same set of
transactions.
3. At the conclusion of the LOR case,
the jury ruled in favor of LOR and against
Defendant, Thompson.
7

4. The issues in this case, Chance
Collar Company vs. Murray et al are identical
to the issues adjudicated in LOR, Inc. vs.
Murray et al.
5. The jury, after hearing the
evidence, ruled against Defendant, Thompson,
in the LOR case finding he was not a good
faith purchaser but had acquired the drill
collars by fraud. Based on the jury verdict,
a final judgment on the merits has been
entered.
6. Defendant, Samuel C. Thompson, in
the LOR case is the same person as Samuel C.
Thompson in this case.
7. The issues presented in both the LOR
case and this case were completely, fully and
fairly litigated at the trial of the LOR
case. Both parties were represented by their
lawyers and evidence regarding both the LOR
drill collars and the Chance Collar Company
drill collars was presented showing the
common fraudulent scheme of acquiring the
drill collars by the Defendants.
8. The affidavit submitted by
Defendant, Thompson, in opposition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment does not raise
any material issues of fact as it relates to
the defense of collateral estoppel.
9. Based on the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
(R. 215-216)
From these findings the court ordered that the plaintiff1s
motion for summary judgment was granted and that the plaintiff
was entitled to immediate possession of the 12 slick drill
collars.

(R. 216)

The court went on to order Samuel Thompson to

assist plaintiff in obtaining possession of them.

(R. 216)

The

judgment dismissed the "counterclaim" [sic] of defendant Thompson
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and reserved the issue of damages incurred by the plaintiff for
two drill collars which were sold prior to the entry of the
preliminary injunction in this matter.

(R. 217)

Defendant sought to appeal the entry of summary judgment,
(R. 221) but the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as the
trial court's decision was not a final decision for purposes of
appeal under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Final Judgment was entered pursuant to stipulation of the parties
on the reserved issues of damages and costs on June 21, 1988.
(R. 255-257)

Thereafter, the defendant filed its notice of this

appeal on July 13, 1988. (R. 258)
B.

Issues of Fact in the Record

The pleadings, affidavits, exhibits, and other documents,
which comprise the record in this matter are replete with
conflicting evidence on material issues of fact.

These include,

but may not be limited to the following:
1.

As to the issue of the date of sale and delivery of the

drill collars
a.

at issue in this matter:
The original complaint (R. 1) filed on or about

September 23, 1983, and the amended complaint filed on or
about February 24, 1984, (R. 21) claimed that the collars
were sold the defendants on or about August 16, 1983.

To

support this allegations, the plaintiff attached an exhibit
to both complaints which purports to be the invoice of the
transaction. (R. 3 and 25)

Although the date is illegible
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on this Exhibit "A", it is assumed it would be August 16,
In addition, this Exhibit "A11 shows that a Mr. Jim

1983.

Morris earned a $240.00 commission from Chance on each
collar sold to Lane Murray.
b.

The affidavit of Wayne Robke (R. 29) submitted in

support of plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction also alleges the sale of
the collars was on August 16, 1983, (R. 29) and that Lane
Murray ordered the collars himself.
c.

(R. 29)

However, the plaintiff's answers to request for

admissions, interrogatories and requests for production of
documents (R. 57-92) are not consistent with these
allegations even though Wayne Robke is identified as the
person answering them.

(R. 57)

These documents state that

the collars were ordered on July 28, 1983, and delivered on
August 3, 1983.

(R. 58)

Inconsistently with the notations

on Exhibit "A" to the complaint that Jim Morris earned a
commission on the sale at issue, the answers to
interrogatories also state that Jim Morris is not employed
by Chance Collar, but instead is believed to be an agent of
Lane Murray.

The answers go on to state that Mr. Morris

ordered the drill collars from Chance as an agent for Lane
Murray.
d.

(R. 59)
Finally, the exhibit attached as Exhibit "A" to the

answers to interrogatories which purports to be the sales
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order and invoices for the collars is completely different
than the invoice attached as Exhibit "A" to the complaint
and amended complaint.
July 29, 1983.
2.

Exhibit "A" to the answers is dated

(R. 81)

As to the central issue of the alleged fraudulent credit

information given by Samuel Thompson:
a.

In his answer to the amended complaint, Samuel

Thompson denies giving the plaintiff any credit information
on Lane Murray.
b.

(R. 47)

In Robke's affidavit, Mr. Robke states that Mr.

Murray gave Mr. Thompson's name to Chance Collar as a credit
reference and that agents of Chance Collar contacted Mr.
Thompson and were given the fraudulent information.

(R.

29-30)
c.

In answering the interrogatories, however, Mr.

Robke attaches an Exhibit "B" which indicates Mr. Morris
gave Mr. Thompson's name to Chance Collar as a reference.
(R. 90) Further contradictions arise as to whom Mr. Thompson
was to have given the fraudulent credit information.

First,

in his answer to Interrogatory 7(d), Mr. Robke indicates
that he was the person asking the questions regarding Mr.
Murray's credit.

(R. 61)

Yet, in the answer to

interrogatory 18, Mr. Robke indicates that Debye Morgan made
initial contact with Sam Thompson on July 28 and a Mr. Hugh
Vogel made follow-up contact on July 29.
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(R. 65)

d.

Finally, although the plaintiff attaches telephone

records to verify these allegations, Samuel Thompson's
affidavit states that his phone number was (801) 789-7198
and that there could not have been any calls to that number
on the dates in question because a fire had destroyed phone
service to his place of business on those days.

(R.

161-162)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I
The trial court erred in applying the doctrine of collateral
estoppel to grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in this
matter for two reasons.

First, the record in this case does not

contain sufficient documentation from the case already litigated
and relied upon by the plaintiffs to determine if the issues in
this matter are identical to those in that case.

Second, the

pleadings, affidavits and other documents in this record indicate
that, in fact, the contrary is true, and the issues in the two
cases are not identical for purposes of applying collateral
estoppel.
II
The trial court was precluded from granting plaintff's
motion for summary judgment because the record in this matter
contains material issues of fact, the determination of which is
essential to the resolution of this case.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE
DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The theory and applicability of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel was outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in Robertson v.
Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983).

In Robertson, the court

stated:
Collateral estoppel is a branch of what was
once lumped with other rules under the
general doctrine of res judicata. Collateral
estoppel is distinct from the rules of bar
and merger - other branches of res judicata in that it precludes relitigation only of
issues actually tried in a prior action, and
it may be invoked even though the subsequent
cause of action is different from the former.
Id. at 1230 (citations omitted) (Emphasis added and in original).
The court went on to emphasize that

lf

[w]hat is critical is

whether the issue that was actually litigated in the first suit
was essential to resolution of that suit and is the same factual
issue as that raised in the second suit."

Id.

(emphasis added).

The test to determine if collateral estoppel applies was
outlined by this Court of Appeals in Copper State Thrift & Loan
v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Utah App. 1987).

In Bruno, this court

stated:
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the
following test to determine if collateral
estoppel applies:
1. Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one presented
in the action in question?
13

2.
merits?

Was there a final judgment on the

3. Was the party against whom the plea
is asserted a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication?
4. Was the issue in the first case
competently, fully, and fairly litigated?
Id. at 389. (citing Searle Bros, v. Searlef 588 P.2d 689, 691
(Utah 1978)).
Applying these principals and elements of this test to the
case currently on appeal, the trial court erred in granting
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of
collateral estoppel because the threshhold element of the test
has simply not been met.

There is no evidence in the Chance

record that the issues decided in the LOR case were the same as
the issues in this case.

Because the two cases involved separate

transactions, there would have had to be evidence in the Chance
record that the jury in the LOR case heard evidence and found
that fraudulent credit information was relayed by Samuel Thompson
to a person acting on behalf of Chance.

It is clear that the

issue of fraudulent credit information to the agents of LOR is
not the same issue as fraudulent credit information to agents of
Chance.
In addition, the issue of whether Lane Murray paid LOR for
the drill collars delivered by LOR is not the same as whether
Lane Murray paid Chance for separate drill collars delivered by
Chance.

Once again, there would have to have been evidence

before the LOR jury as to nonpayment to Chance.
14

Although the plaintiff makes a bare, self-serving assertion
in its memo in support of the motion that the issues were
identical in the two cases, there is no independent evidence or
documentation in the Chance record to support this claim.

While

the plaintiff submitted a memorandum of supporting documents from
the LOR case, (R. 179) these documents were submitted nine days
after Judge Davidson granted the motion for summary judgment as
shown by the minute entry dated September 9, 1985. (R. 178)

As a

result, he could not have reviewed them prior to his decision.
In addition, the documents attached do not contain information
sufficient to determine if the issues were in fact identical in
the two cases.

There are no documents included indicating that

findings of fact were made by the LOR jury and there is nothing
to indicate what those findings were.
only show, in essence,

Instead, the documents

the pleadings and the jury's verdict as

to which party was entitled to possession of the drill collars at
issue in the LOR case.
Further, the LOR documents submitted in the Chance case do
not contain anything to indicate that the LOR jury heard evidence
on a common scheme of fraudulent activity or any evidence as to
acquisition of the Chance collars by fraud.

Even so, these two

findings are set forth in the findings of fact in the Chance
summary judgment. (R. 215)

As there is no basis in the record to

support such statements, summary judgment was inappropriate.
Instead, in granting summary judgment and making the
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findings of fact required to do so, Judge Davidson seems to rely
on the fact that he presided at the LOR trial. (R. 214)

This

does not, however, provide an adequate basis to grant summary
judgment as there is no independent evidence of the LOR findings
of fact in the Chance record.

As a result, any evidence of

findings from the LOR case were not properly before Judge
Davidson for his consideration.

In addition, there is nothing in

the record that the trier-of-fact in LOR even considered evidence
pertaining to the defendant's transaction with this plaintiff,
Chance Collar.

Absent this independent documentation supporting

plaintiff's bare assertion that the issues were identical and
that the jury in the LOR case heard and considered the evidence
to establish facts at issue in this case, the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment based on collateral estoppel.
Finally, not only is there no independent evidence in the
record as to the similarity of the issues, the documentation in
the Chance record indicates just the opposite -- that indeed the
issues were not identical.

First, the record shows the

plaintiffs were in no way related and that they each completed
separate transactions with Lane Murray for the sale of separate
drill collars.

Second, early in the case, the plaintiff made a

motion to consolidate the Chance case with the LOR case based on
the allegations that the legal and factual issues were identical.
(R. 105-107)

While this motion was denied, the subsequent

summary judgment was granted on essentially the same basis.
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The

two rulings are inherently inconsistent.

Third, there was

evidence produced in the Chance case that was not produced in the
LOR case.

In Chance, the plaintiff sought to rely on telephone

records as evidence to support its allegations that Samuel
Thompson gave fraudulent credit information to agents of Chance.
(R. 86-91)

As these records were new evidence not before the LOR

jury, and the validity and credibility of this evidence was at
issue due to Samuel Thompson's affidavit, (R. 161) it was
inappropriate to grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, because the record is devoid of documentation to
establish whether the issues in the LOR and Chance cases were
identical and because the record does indicate that the cases do
not have an identical set of issues, the first element of the
test for collateral estoppel outlined in the Bruno case is not
satisfied.

Not having satisfied this initial element, the other

three elements of the collateral estoppel test become irrelevant
or inapplicable.

As a result, collateral estoppel does not apply

to this case, and the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment.

It should be vacated by this court

and the case should be remanded for further proceedings.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE
RECORD ESTABLISHES UNRESOLVED MATERIAL ISSUES
OF FACT PRECLUDING JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF
AS A MATTER OF LAW
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions
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for summary judgment.

Rule 56(c) sets forth the standard a

moving party must establish to prevail on such a motion.
states, in pertinent part, that:

It

lf

[t]he judgment sought shall be

rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law."

This language, of course, precludes summary

judgment where there is a dispute as to material facts.

(See

Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977).)
The guidelines for a court in approaching a motion for summary
judgment were summarized by the Utah Supreme Court in Mountain
States v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984),
wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated:
[U]nder Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P., summary
judgment can be granted only if the record
shows that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Doubts, uncertainties or inferences
concerning issues of fact must be construed
in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. Litigants must be
able to present their cases fully to the
court before judgment can be rendered against
them unless it is obvious from the evidence
before the court that the party opposing
judgment can establish no right to recovery.
The trial court must not weigh evidence or
assess credibility.
Id. at 1261 (footnotes omitted).

The Utah Supreme Court went on

to state that, while findings and conclusions are unnecessary to
support the granting of summary judgment, that remedy is
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precluded where there are issues of fact inherent in the findings
and conclusions.

The court stated that "[t]he trial judge saw

fit to make and enter findings and conclusions, the content of
which evidence the existence of material issues of fact.
Therefore, the grant of summary judgment is precluded."

Id.

In the case currently on appeal, the record is replete with
evidence of material issues of fact such that the trial court
erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

These

issues include, but may not be limited to the following:
1.

Did Lane Murray purchase drill collars from plaintiff

and fail to pay for them?
a.

The complaint (R. 1) and amended complaint (R. 21)

allege the drill collars were purchased on August 16, 1983.
To support this allegation, an invoice is attached to each
as Exhibit "A".

(R. 3 and 25) The answers to

interrogatories state that the collars were purchased on
July 28, 1983, and delivered on August 3, 1983. (R. 58)

To

support this answer, a completely different invoice is
attached as Exhibit "A".
b.

(R. 81)

Exhibit "A" to the complaint shows that Jim Morris

earned a commission from Chance Collar on the sale of
collars to Samuel Thompson. (R. 3)

In the answers to

interrogatories, plaintiff claims Jim Morris worked for Lane
Murray and ordered the collars from Chance Collar.

(R. 59)

In his affidavit, Wayne Robke states that Lane Murray
himself ordered the collars.
19

(R. 29)

2.

Did defendant Samuel Thompson give agents of Chance

Collar Company fraudulent credit information about Lane Murray?
a.

Wayne Robke's affidavit states that defendant Lane

Murray gave plaintiff the name of Samuel Thompson as a
credit reference.

(R. 29)

In plaintiff's answers to

interrogatories, Wayne Robke stated Jim Morris gave
plaintiff the name of Samuel Thompson as a credit reference.
(R. 90)
b.

In the answer to interrogatories, 7(b), Wayne

Robke, answering for plaintiff, indicates that he solicited
and obtained the credit information from Samuel Thompson.
(R. 60)

In the answer to interrogatory 18, Mr. Robke states

that this information was given to Debye Morgan and Hugh
Vogel. (R. 65)
c.

The plaintiff relies on telephone records to show

that agents of plaintiff talked to Samuel Thompson on
certain days and received the information at issue.
However, in his affidavit, Samuel Thompson stated that the
calls at issue could not have been made as a fire had
interrupted phone service to his shop on the days at issue.
(R. 162)

Also, in the affidavit he again denies that he

gave any credit information on Lane Murray to plaintiff at
any time.
These examples of conflicting evidence in the record before the
Chance court establish that there are issues of fact in this
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m a t t e r essential to resolution of this c a s e .
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the trial court in the summary judgment.
In addition, summary judgment was precluded in this matter
due to the existence of material issues of fact which are central
to the resolution of this matter.

These issues include whether

or not Samuel Thompson gave fraudulent credit information to the
plaintiff's agents, and this issue is the primary basis upon
which relief was granted to plaintiffs in summary judgment.
Therefore, the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment and this court should vacate this
judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of November, 1988.
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